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This theoretical paper considers mandated cost shifting as a way of providing care for 
the poor. The method is similar to user fee health care systems with exemption policies 
for the poor. In the model, the government mandates th  proper treatment of illness 
regardless of the ability to pay, and enforces that m ndate with investigation. The results 
show that under costly investigation the physician r domly cheats by providing the 
wrong treatment to some types of patients. In respon e, the government also randomly 
investigates the treatment of such patients. The results also showed that cost shifting, 
hence user fee, deteriorates the welfare of both the rich and the poor as investigation 
becomes costly.  
 





In every society there are poor individuals. A policy issue is the provision of the 
necessities of life to the poorest individuals in a society. One necessity is health care. If a 
society is not willing to see the poor die from treatable diseases then the provision of 
health care must involve some component of redistribution from the rich to the poor. 
Even with improvements in heath-care technology, this is a problem, which may get 
worse. As health-care technology improves, the costof treating some diseases may fall, 
but the set of treatable diseases may grow.   
One contribution mechanism that is common in the healt  care market of many 
developing countries is user fees. User fee does not inv lve redistribution from the rich to 
the poor. However, it is not socially desirable forthe poor to be denied treatment as a 
result of inability to pay. Thus most user fee policies have exemption policies for the poor 
in society. According to the literature (e.g., Gilson, 1997; Nyonator and Kutzin, 1999; 
Valdivia, 2005; Haveman, 2009), the difficulty of identifying the poor makes the 




exemption policies non-functional in practice (the policy may still be non-functional in small 
communities where the poor can easily be identified). The implication here is that the rich 
receive the treatment they desire and the poor go untreated. This may not always be the 
case because both private and public health facilities may not want to be notorious about 
denying care to the poor. Health care providers maythen find it desirable to provide care 
to the poor and charge it to the rich. This paper shows the welfare implications of such 
behaviour on both the rich and the poor. 
The paper models a system in which the government ma dates health care providers to 
shift cost from poor patients to rich patients. The ex mption policies in the health care 
system with user fee are designed with the intention that access to life-saving treatment 
would not depend on ability to pay. A question is, do people die from treatable diseases 
due to an inability to pay in these societies? The answer is yes, but fewer than one might 
initially imagine. In Ghana for example mission hospitals (these are hospitals owned by 
Islam or Christian churches) would not send uninsured patients away as a result of 
inability to pay but would but would keep them in the hospitals until the fee is paid. 
Undoubtedly, many such patients would be allowed to go home when it becomes obvious 
that payment is impossible. Such practice is even fou d in public hospitals in developed 
economies as well. Take the case of Canada prior to the implementation of a publicly 
financed health care system. Consider a community doctor faced by a patient with a life-
threatening disease that could be treated but only at a cost beyond the means of the 
patient. Were these patients allowed to die? Undoubtedly some were, but some doctors 
treated the patients, billed them, but did not collect payment (Evans, 1984). How would a 
doctor or a hospital cover cost with revenue below c sts for poor patients? The answer, of 
course, is with revenue above costs for rich patients, that is, with cost shifting. It is a form 
of private redistribution from rich to poor or from orchestrated by doctors and hospitals. 
The redistribution can also be from patients with adequate insurance to those with 
inadequate insurance (McArdle, 2009; Peduda, 2006). 
Non-user fee health care systems, such as national health insurance system in Ghana, 
publicly financed health care in Canada, subsidization of health care for the poor or aged 
in Kenya and Uganda, or even direct redistribution through the tax system as in the 
optimal taxation literature, are public-sector intensive approaches in comparison with 
cost-shifting.  In particular under cost shifting, the redistribution from rich to poor is 
orchestrated by the doctor using the price system so that no resources flow through the 
hands of the government. If the operation of governme t uses resources (e.g. the 
taxman’s salary) or wastes resources (e.g. corruption) then this lack of public sector 
intensity can be a comparative benefit of the cost-shif ing approach. Government 
operation becomes even more costly in economies with large informal sector, as in the 
case of many developing countries. 
The purpose of this paper is to study mandated cost-shifting as a redistributive approach 
to the problem of providing adequate health care to the poor in the presence of costly 
government. The costliness of government can be due to high cost of the resources used, 
corruption, mismanagement, etc. The model extends Leger (2000) by introducing two 
categories of patients, rich and poor.  It combines the capitation in Leger with fee for 
services, and replaces the insurance firm in Leger with a costly government that mandates 
the treatment of patients regardless of ability to pay. The patient’s illness is either of high 




or low severity, which can be treated with high or l w treatment, respectively. Both 
patients pay the same fee for low treatment but the rich pay a higher fee for high 
treatment. Since mandated cost shifting allows physicians to charge the rich a higher 
price than the poor, it gives incentive to the selfi h physician to cheat by providing 
inappropriate treatment to the patients. Government investigation is thus needed to give 
the physician the incentive to treat the patient appro riately. The physician pays a fine if 
found guilty, and government gives any excess revenue after investigation to the poor as 
a subsidy. The results of the study show that the physician has the incentive to cheat by 
over-providing care to the rich and under-providing care for the poor. Compared to the 
user fee case, the results indicate that even though society wants the poor to receive care 
regardless of ability to pay, the asymmetric information in health care provision 
(equivalent to costly investigation) leads to a welfar  loss to both the rich and the poor.  
THE MODEL 
This is a game with two players: the physician (representing a health care provider and so can 
be a doctor, a hospital, a clinic, etc.,) and the government, and passive agents who are 
patients in a free entry and exit market. The use of free entry and exit allows the analysis 
to focus on the effect of mandated cost shifting without adding any other inefficiency that 
may exist in the health care market as a result of the absence of free entry and exit. There 
are two types of patients: rich and poor, indexed j = R or P. The rich here includes middle 
income and above. Categorizing people into rich andpoor is the practice even in the 
world of a continuum wealth. The United States for example, uses family income to 
determine whether one is (rich or middle income) or p or (and hence qualifies for 
Medicaid). In Ireland there are medical card patients (poor) and private patients (rich or 
middle income). Let r be the proportion of the rich among the patients ad (1 – r) be the 
proportion of the poor. A patient gets sick only once, drawing from two severities of 
illness: low severity (θ L) and high severity θ H). The rich and the poor draw from the 
distribution θ = {θ L, θ H} with probabilities πj and (1- πj) respectively. The successful 
treatment of θ H requires high treatment, eH, and that of θ L requires low treatment, eL, 
with eL < eH. Income is observable to the doctor and the governm nt. In developing 
countries where there is a large informal sector peoples’ income are identified by their area of 
residence. Two cases are examined: costless investigation and costly investigation. Both 
the physician and the government can costlessly observe the type of illness under costless 
investigation but only the physician observes the type of illness costlessly with costly 
investigation. After observing the type of illness, the physician chooses the treatment 
type. While the illness type is not costlessly observable to the government, the treatment 
type is observable. 
The government collects a lump-sum tax, γR, from rich patients to fund the investigation 
of the physician and for redistribution to the poor. It pays a lump-sum subsidy, γp, to the 
poor.  In an extreme case in which it is too costly for the government to collect any revenue, it 
can borrow to finance investigation. A patient pays a fee, Ci (i = H or L), for treatment and 
spends the rest of their income, yj ± γj-Ci, on all other goods and services consumed, where 
yj - γj  =  yR - γR  for j = R and yj + γj.= yp + γp. Their health status, δ(θ i, ei), is a function of 
illness and treatment. Their utility function is: )),(,( iiijjj eCyU θδγ −± , and U1 > 0, 




U2 > 0 and U11 ≤ 0, U21 = U12 = 0. The physician’s utility is V(Ci,ei); V2 < 0, V1 > 0, V11 < 
0, and V(0,0) = 0. The assumption U12 = 0 is added to simplify the calculations. The removal of 
this assumption does not affect the results qualitatively. 
In a free entry and exit market, physicians earn zeo profit for each type of treatment and 
so V(CL*, eL) = V(CH*,eH) = 0 and with eH > eL, it follows that CH* > CL*. In a free entry 
and exit market V(CH*, eH) = V(CL*, eL) = 0 because if one is positive the physician 
increase their utility by providing the treatment type that provides positive utility. Besides 
with free entry and exit, other physicians will entr and compete it away. Alternatively, if 
one is negative then physicians will exit the market. Without any redistribution it is 
assumed that the poor cannot afford CH*. With γp = 0, it is also assumed the poor cannot 
pay more than CL* for health care. It is assumed that the poor cannot aff rd the actuarially 
fair insurance premium: πpCL + (1-πp)CH. A standard approach to such inequality would 
be for the government to redistribute income through the tax system by collecting enough 
revenue to subsidise the poor who receive high treatm nt. However, such a solution is not 
necessarily optimal in this model because of the additional assumption of a costly 
government. Following Burbridge and Myers (2004), the model assumes that government 
is costly. The assumption is that for every dollar of revenue collected a given 
percentage,ω, is lost. In an extreme case in which ω = 1 all revenue collected is lost 
through the costliness of government.  
If the government uses a tax system then the government’s budget is balanced if what is 
collected after waste is equal to what the poor with h gh treatment receive, i.e., r(1 - ω)γR  












R . Thus γR 
approaches infinity as ω approaches one, for any finite (CH*- CL). The use of the tax 
system for redistribution in the presence of a costly government then is not optimal. 
Alternatively, the government is allowed to redistribute income through the health 
care system by directly mandating the physician to give any patient the proper treatment 
and to charge the poor CL* for either treatments, and charge the rich CL* for eL. The 
market then determines the high treatment fee, CS, paid by the rich through free entry and 
exit of physicians or zero expected profit.  
With both the rich and the poor paying CL* for low treatment such that V(CL*,eL) = 
0, with eH  > eL, and with the poor paying CL* for eH, it follows that V(CL*, eH) < 0, i.e., 
the physician makes a loss from treating a poor patient with eH. The physician can only 
earn a positive utility if V(CS*, eH) > V(CH*, eH) = 0 implying that CS* > CH*  > CL*. The 
focus of the paper is redistribution not insurance. The poor patient pays CL* in either 
illness state so has no incentive to insure. The rich patient can be assumed risk neutral to 
avoid the insurance issue. The inequality however cr ates incentives for the physician to 
cheat when choosing treatment type. The physician my not always use the right type of 
treatment, but here the choice of treatment would depend on the patient’s income type. It 
is assumed then that with probability αjL/H the physician chooses eL to treat a patient of 
type j, given that the patient has drawn θ H (cheats), and with probability (1 - αjL/H) she 
treats the patient with eH. With probability αjL/L the physician chooses eL to treat a patient 




who has drawn θL and with a probability (1-αjL/L) the physician treats the patient with eH 
(cheats). 
In order to protect the welfare of patients, the government investigates the physician. The 
timing is as follows. The government mandates the following behaviour from the 
physician: for all patients, treat θ H with eH and charge the poor CL*, treat θ L with eL and 
charge CL*  whether the patient is rich or poor. Next, a patient of an income type comes to 
a doctor and must be accepted. This is a strong assumption but a structure where doctors 
are expected to do some treatment for the poor could be constructed. One can consider a 
case in which society frowns at doctors who send poor atients away without treatment. 
The need for a good reputation (in order not to lose patients) then can induce doctors to 
provide some treatment even if inadequate regardless of ability to pay.  The income 
type is observable to both the doctor and the governm nt. (In a developed economy 
where the formal sector is large one can imagine the patient’s ID card, issued by the 
government, reflects income type. In a developing economy where the informal sector is 
large, patient’s income type could be identified by their address or race). The doctor 
costlessly observes the illness type. The doctor then chooses whether or not to cheat (α).
Simultaneously, the government chooses whether or not to investigate conditional on the 
observed income type and treatment type eH or eL. Because the patient’s illness type is 
not observable to the government without investigation, there is private information and 
the solution concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Thus, it is assumed that the 
government investigates the physician with probability µjL for a patient of income type j 
who has received eL, and with probability (1-µjL) it does not investigate. For eH, it 
investigates with probability µjH, and with (1-µjH) it does not investigate. 
If the government investigates it will be able to find out whether or not the physician used 
the right treatment, but it incurs a cost, k. If the physician is found guilty of using the 
wrong effort she pays a fine, φ. As discussed in Becker (1968) and Shavell (1991), setting 
the fine sufficiently high would deter the physician from cheating. The problem with this 
is that of credibility (Andreoni, 1991). If the government sets the fine extremely high then 
the physician will not expect the government to implement it and so will cheat. Thus it is 
only assumed that the fine, φ  satisfies the conditions which require that the physician is 
better off not cheating than cheating and being caught with certainty (One advantage of 
cost shifting is that this usual credibility issue is less of a problem here because the physician who 
does not treat a severely ill patient, for financial reason, could expect a serious punishment):  
 ),(),(0 ** LLHL eCVeCV φ−>>          (1) 
),(),(0 ** HSLL eCVeCV φ−>=              (2) 
Equation (1) states that given the government investigates, the fine is high enough such 
that the physician is better off using eH to treat a poor patient who has drawn θ H, than 
treating him with eL and being fined. Similarly, (2) states that, given the government 
investigates, the fine is high enough such that the physician is better off using eL to treat a 
rich patient who has drawn θ L, than treating him with eH and being fined.  
As already explained, it costs resources for the government to collect taxes. Given that a 
physician is found guilty, the physician pays a fine. The fine collection is assumed to 
require less time resource than that required to locate a rich person and tax the one. Let σ 




denote the extent to which the cost of tax collection exceeds the cost of fine collection. 
Thus the costliness of government for fine collection is τ = ω - σ. The following 
assumptions are added: 
Assumption 1: U( yj ± γj – Cg, δ(θ H, eH)) > U( yj ± γj - Cg, δ(θ H, eL)), (g = S, L) a patient 
of type j with high severity of illness is better off when treated with eH than when treated 
with eL given the fees for type j. 
Assumption 2: U(yj ± γj - CL, δ(θ L, eL)) > U(yj ± γj - Cg, δ(θ L, eH)), a patient with low 
severity of illness is better off when treated with eL than when treated with eH given the 
fee paid. 
Assumption 3: k < (1 - πp)(1 - τ)φ and k < πR(1 - τ)φ. The expected net fine collected 
from investigation, given the physician is found guilty, exceeds the cost of investigation. 
This assumption implies that the costliness of governm nt for fine collection is strictly 
less than one in the model. It is shown later on in the paper that when the government is 
costly enough to make mandated cost shifting more optimal than the direct redistribution 
of tax.  
It is assumed that and the government’s objective function, EW(αjL/L, αjL/H, γj), is the sum 
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. The first two 
terms in the first square brackets represent a pooratient’s expected utility when treated 
with eL. The second two terms represent the patient’s expected utility when treated with 
eH. Similarly, the first two terms in the second square brackets represent the rich patient’s 
expected utility when treated with eL and the remaining two terms represent his expected 







































R φτµβµβ      (4)          
The first term in (4) represents the lump-sum tax collected from the rich after waste and 
the second term represents the lump-sum subsidy that is tr nsferred to the poor. The first 
two terms in the first square bracket represent the expected net fine collected from 
investigating the physician for treating a poor patient with eL. The two remaining terms 
represent the expected fine collected from investigatin  the physician for treating the 
poor with eH. The second square bracket represents expected fin collected from 
investigating the physician for the treatments provided to the rich with the first two terms 




for the high treatment and the last two for low trea ment. The physician’s expected utility 







































The first square bracket in the first term represent  the expected utility from treating a 
poor patient with eL. The second square bracket represents the expected utility from 
treating the poor patient with eH.  
































+−+−−=      (5b) 
The first square bracket represents the doctor’s expected utility from treating a rich 
patient with eH and the second square bracket represents her expect d utility from treating 
a rich patient with eL. The game is between a doctor with one patient and the government. 
But it can be generalized to more than one patient, N, by assuming enough linearity in the 
doctor’s utility function or NV(C, e) = V(NCi, Nei). Example, V(C, e) = Ci - ei. The model 
is solved and discussed under two main cases: costless and costly investigation cases.   
COSTLESS INVESTIGATION CASE 
Assume the government does not incur any cost of investigation, k = 0. The government 
chooses its strategies to maximize (3) subject to (4) with k = 0. Its strategies consist of 
choosing µji taking αj i and CS*as given and choosing the optimal tax and subsidy. Notice 
that (3) is not a function of µji so the investigation is for revenue reasons only. The
physician simultaneously chooses treatment type after observing the illness type, taking 
µji as given. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies ar  as follows:  
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PROPOSITION 1: Given that k = 0, the government investigates with probability less 
than one when it observes that a rich patient has received a low treatment or a poor 
patient has received a high treatment. However, the government may always investigate 
or investigates with a high probability when it observes that a rich patient has received a 
high treatment or a poor patient has received a lowtreatment. (Proof: see appendix 1.3 
a) 
From (1) and (2), 0 < 
*L
Rµ < 1, 0 < 
*H
Rµ < 1. Intuitively, with V(C
S*, eH) > V(CL*, eL), the 
physician has incentive to cheat when treating a rich patient who has low severity of 
illness and a poor patient who has high severity of illness. Thus, the government will 




always investigate or investigate at a high probability because it incurs no cost in doing 
so and that it will collect a fine if the physician is found guilty. However, with V(CL*, eH) 
<  V(CL*, eL), the physician has no incentive to treat a rich patient who has high severity 
of illness with low treatment or a poor patient who has low severity of illness with high 
treatment. However, because investigation is costless, the government may investigate 
when it observes that a poor patient has been treated with high treatment and a rich 
patient with low treatment, i.e., 1> µpH* ≥ 0, 1 > µRL* ≥ 0. 
The physician chooses her strategies to maximize her expected utility taking the 
government’s strategies as given. The strategies are as follows: 
αpL/H* = (1 - αpL/L*) = (1 –αRL/L*) =  αRL/H* = 0,                     (7) 
PROPOSITION 2: Given k = 0, the physician plays the pure strategy of not cheating 
when treating patients. (Proof: see appendix 1.3.a). 
Intuitively, with V(CS*, eH) > V(CL*, eL), the physician has no incentive to treat a rich 
patient who has high severity of illness with low treatment, hence αRL/H* = 0. In the same 
way, with V(CL*, eH) < V(CL*, eL ), the physician has no incentive to treat a poor patient 
who has low severity of illness with high treatment, hence αpL/L* = 1. If the government 
finds the physician has used a wrong effort it fines the physician. The physician, knowing 
that the government can observe the type of illness costlessly, expects to pay a fine 
anytime she uses the wrong effort to treat a patient. By (1) and (2), the physician is better 
off providing the right treatment than providing a wrong treatment and being fined. Thus, 
the physician will always provide the right effort. With k = 0, the government does not 
need to collect revenue for investigation so γR* = γp* = 0.  
The equilibrium is efficient or first best because there is no cheating and no costly 
investigation or taxation. Both patients receive thright treatment and the rich do not 
have to pay for investigation through the tax system. Assuming that each doctor’s draw 
of patients out of the rich/poor patient distribution is that of the population (r, 1-r) and 
that the doctor’s utility function satisfies NV(Ci, ei) = V(NCi, Nei). Substituting in (7), C S * 










eCVreCVr ππ    
        (8) 
This determines CS*(CL, πR, πp, r, eH). These results are driven by the costless 
investigation on the type of illness. The assumption of k > 0 will give second-best results. 
COSTLY INVESTIGATION CASE 
The government can find the illness type but only through investigation at cost k > 0. As 
before the government chooses µji, ∈ (0,1), and γj, taking αji as given, to maximize (3) 
subject to (4). Similarly, the physician simultaneously chooses αjL/L, ∈ (0,1), and αjL/H ∈ 
(0,1), taking µji as given, to maximize (5). The government’s equilibrium strategies are as 
follows: 
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Rµ are defined in (6). 
PROPOSTION 3: The government investigates the physician with probabilities that are 
strictly positive and less than one when it observes the physician has provided high 
treatment for a rich patient and low treatment for a poor patient. However the 
government does not investigate when it observes a poor patient is treated with high 
treatment and when a rich patient is treated with low treatment. (Proof: see appendix 
1.3.b). 
From (1) and (2) µpL* and µRH* are positive and less than one and so are mixed strategies. 
The government plays the pure strategy of not investigating when it observes that a poor 
patient has received high treatment and a rich patient has received low treatment. The 
government however plays a mixed strategy when it observes that a poor patient has 
received low treatment and a rich patient has receiv d high treatment. 
Intuitively, µRL* = 0 because with V(CS*,eH) > V(CL*, eL), the physician has no incentive 
to treat a rich patient with eL given that the patient has drawn θ H. Similarly, µpH* = 0, i.e., 
the government does not investigate when it observe that a poor patient has been treated 
with eH. As before, this is because with V(CL*, eL) > V(CL*, eH), the physician has no 
incentive to use eH to treat a poor patient given that the patient has dr wn θL. However, 
with V(CS*, eH) > V(CL*, eL), the physician has the incentive to treat a rich patient with eH 
given that the patient has drawn θ L. In the same way, with V(CL*, eL) > V(CL*, eH) the 
physician has the incentive to treat a poor patient with  eL given that the patient has drawn 
θ H. If the government always investigates the physician will never cheat. But if the 
physician never cheats then the government will not i vestigate. Thus, the government 
plays a mixed strategy in equilibrium.  
The physician’s strategies are: 
























α  (11) 
PROPOSITION 4: With probabilities that are positive but less than o e, the physician 
provides high treatment to a rich patient given that e has drawn low severity of illness 
and provides low treatment to a poor patient given that he has drawn high severity of 
illness. However, the physician always provides lowtreatment to a poor patient given 
that the patient has drawn low severity of illness and provides high treatment to a rich 
patient given that the patient has drawn high severity of illness. (Proof: see appendix 
1.3.b).    
Thus, αpL/H* and (1- αRL/L*) are positive and by Assumption 3 they are less than one. The 
physician again plays the pure strategy, of not cheating when treating a poor patient with 
low severity of illness and a rich patient with hig severity of illness. The physician 
however plays a mixed strategy when treating a pooratient with high severity of illness 
or a rich patient with low severity of illness. Note that as k approaches zero, the costless 
investigation results are obtained.  
The assumption that it is too costly for government to collect revenue implies that 
γR* = γp* = 0 (proof: see appendix 1.3.c). With free entry and exit, the physician’s 




expected utility goes to zero in equilibrium. Then following the same procedure as used 
for (8) but now using (9) and (10), results in (8) again. Thus, CS*(CL, πR, πp, r, eH) from 
(8) is the same as that under costly investigation. This strong result comes from the mixed 
strategies. In equilibrium, the government chooses its strategies to make the physician 
indifferent between cheating and not cheating whether or not k is zero. 
The costly investigation equilibrium is Pareto inferior to the costless investigation 
equilibrium because those who get the right treatmen  are indifferent, but those who get 
the wrong treatment are worse off. The costly investigation case then is inefficient and 
the inefficiency consists of over-utilization of care for the rich and under-utilization of 
care for the poor.  
The results so far show that as investigation becoms ore costly the equilibrium of 
mandated cost shifting becomes less efficient. As already explained, the free entry and 
exit assumption gives the physician no incentive to cheat when there is no income 
difference between patients. Thus direct redistribuion of income through the tax system 
should achieve efficiency in terms of treatment. Such equilibrium is achievable under 
mandated cost shifting if investigation is not costly. Efficiency then suggests that the 
government invest in innovative technologies to mini ze the cost of investigation.  
CONCLUSION 
When it is too costly for a government to collect revenue, mandated cost shifting as a 
means of providing health services to the poor can be less wasteful than using the tax 
system. This paper has shown that, when investigation is costly, the physician randomly 
uses the wrong treatment for patients.  
Even though government mandating direct redistribution of revenue from the rich to the 
poor is not observed in the real world, user fees can produce similar results in the real 
world. Because it is socially undesirable for the poor to be denied care, health care 
providers may be coerced into, at least sometimes, providing care to those who cannot 
pay. This can only be done through cost shifting which in turn creates incentive to 
sometimes provide the wrong treatment as a result of asymmetric information (equivalent 
to costly investigation).  
Finally, the paper has assumed that information on the patient’s income type is evenly 
distributed between the government and the physician. Efficiency can be distorted when 
the physician or patient has information advantage, because of the resulting increase in 
expected cost of investigation. Cost shifting then is more efficient when information on 
the patient’s income is not costly to the government or physician. 
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1. Appendix:  Proof of Propositions 1 - 4 
Deriving the strategies require working out the government's problem, the physician's 
problem, and the characterizing an equilibrium. Subsection 1.1, focuses on the 
government's problem, 1.2 is the physician's problem and 1.3 characterizes equilibrium. 
1.1. The Governments Problem 
The Government's objective function (EW) and budget constraint (BC) are defined in (3) 






















































































And the non-negativity constraints µpL ≥ 0, µpH ≥ 0, µRL ≥ 0, µRH ≥ 0, γp ≥ 0, γR ≥ 0 
and inequality constraints: 
01 ≥− Lpµ  
01 ≥− Hpµ  
(IE1) 
 (IE2) 
01 ≥− LRµ  
01 ≥− HRµ  
(IE3) 
(IE4) 
The government's problem is to maximize the Lagrangian 
4321 43210 IEIEIEIEBCEW ρρρρρϕ +++++=  
with the choices {µpL, µpH, µRL, µRH, γp, γR} taken as given {αpL/L, αpL/H, αRL/L, αRL/H}, CL* 







































































































































































































































































































Derivatives with respect to the multipliers return the inequality constraints. Because 
government can always increase the utility of individuals with excess revenue, ρ0* > 0. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are given in the table below: 
 























































































































































ϕ γγ  
(A-10)  
(A-11) 
Using the derivatives with respect to ρ0 returns the budget constraint. 
1.2 The Physician’s Problem 
The physician’s problem is to choose their strategies to maximize the sum of (5a) and 
(5b) in the text. The sum will be referred to as EV. The non-negativity constraints are 
αpL/H ≥ 0,αpL/L ≥ 0, αRL/H ≥ 0, αRL/L ≥ 0 and the inequality constraints are:  
01 / ≥− LHpα  
01 / ≥− LLpα  
(IE5) 
(IE6) 
01 / ≥− LHRα  
01 / ≥− LLRα  
(IE7) 
(IE8) 
The Physician's problem is to maximize the function: 
8765 4321 IEIEIEIEEV λλλλξ ++++=  
with the choices {αpL/L, αpL/H, αRL/L, αRL/H} taken as given {µpL, µpH, µRL, µRH, γp, γR}and 



















































The derivative with respect to the multipliers retuns the inequality constraints. The 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
Kuhn-Tucker Condition Label Kuhn-Tucker Condition Label 











































































































































 regardless of the size of µpH. Then from the first order condition in (A-13), λ2* > 





∂ and by 





∂ < 0 



















 so by (A-4) and (A-8) 1 > µRL* ≥ 0 and ρ4 = 0. 














∂  > 0 so that 























ξ , by (1). Then 




ξ are not consistent with the last condition in (A-12). And using (A-




ξ  which is not 
consistent with (A-11). So µpL = 0 is not consistent with the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. 






















ϕ from (A-1). From (1), µpL* < 1 and from (A-5) ρ1*  = 0. Therefore 0 < µpL* ≤ 1 and 

















so ρ3 > 0 for (A-3) to be 





ξ  so λ4 = 0. 








∂  > 0 and so violates (A-15) so ≤ 
αRL/L < 1 is not consistent with Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Hence by (A-19) (1 - αRL/L*) = 0 




















≥  and from (2) 
and (A-7): 0 < µRH* ≤ 1 and ρ3* = 0. This proves equations (6) and (7) in the text. 
1.3.b. Proof of Propositions 3 and 4 
The proofs for µRL*, µpH*, αRL/H* and αRL/L* are the same as when k = 0 and is not be 
repeated. The following then are proof for equations (10) and (11) for αRL/L* and αpL/H*  









ξ  so λ1 = 0. 




ξ  which violates (A-12), so αpL/H > 0 in equilibrium. 











































ξ  are not consistent with the last condition in 




ξ  in 
























πα .  






 so ρ3 > 0 for (A-3) to be satisfied and µRH = 1 for  














∂ > 0, and so violates (A-15) so αRL/L = 0 is not 
consistent with Kuhn-Tucker conditions. 











< 0, so αRL/L = 1 violates (A-15) and so is not consistent with 


















=  Using (2) and (A-7): 0 < µRH* < 1 and 














πα . This proofs equations 11 and 12. 
1.3.c. Proof of γj* 







. The assumption 





Given U1 > 0, ρ0 * > 0 and using the assumption that U21 = U12 = 0, define ωA  
































−−+−−= . With αRL/H*  ≥ 0, (1 - αRL/L*) ≥ 0, αpL/L* = 1, αRL/H*, 




































απφωαπ µµγ  
with each of the last two terms equalling zero and so γp* = 0. 
 
